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Abstract
This article responds to Oscar Horta’s article “In Defense of the Internal 
Aspects View: Person-Affecting Reasons, Spectrum Arguments and 
Inconsistent Intuitions”. I begin by noting various points of agreement 
with Horta. I agree that the “better than relation” is asymmetric, and point 
out that this will be so on an Essentially Comparative View as well as on an 
Internal Aspects View. I also agree that there are various possible Person-
Affecting Principles, other than the one my book focuses on, that people 
might find plausible, and that in some circumstances, at least, these might 
have deontological, rather than axiological significance. In particular, 
I grant that Horta’s Actuality-Dependent Person-Affecting Principle, his 
Time-Dependent Person-Affecting Principle, and his Identity-Dependent 
Person-Affecting Principle, might each be relevant to what we ought to 
do, without necessarily being relevant to which of two outcomes is better. 
But I reject Horta’s claim that essentially comparative principles don’t 
apply in Spectrum Arguments. I also argue against Horta’s view that the 
two Standard Views that underlie our intuitions in Spectrum Arguments 
are contradictory. I question Horta’s (seeming) position that there is 
no point in rejecting the transitivity of the “better than” relation on the 
basis of Spectrum Arguments, on the grounds that doing so won’t solve 
the predicament that Spectrum Arguments pose. Finally, I conclude my 
paper by challenging Horta’s interesting contention that my views about 
nontransitivity support an anti-realist metaethics, and are incompatible 
with the sort of realist approach to metaethics that I favor.
Keywords: Transitivity, Spectrum Arguments, Person-Affecting Principles, 
Internal Aspects View, Better than, Essentially Comparative View, Realism, 
Anti-realism, Sophie’s Choice, Moral Dilemmas.
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Let me begin by acknowledging my gratitude to Oscar Horta for his thoughtful 
and sensitive comments in his article “In Defense of the Internal Aspects 
View: Person-Affecting Reasons, Spectrum Arguments and Inconsistent 
Intuitions” (Horta, 2014), and also for the generous spirit he displayed in 
presenting them. I will divide my responses into two main parts. In part I, 
I will note some points where I agree with Horta. In part II, I will note some 
points about which we disagree. 1
1. 
In section 3, Horta discusses different possible types of Person-Affecting 
Principles, and the question of whether better than can be non-asymmetric. 
As Horta recognizes, the points he makes in this section are not in tension 
with my book’s claims. But I agree that they offer useful lessons to bear in 
mind as we try to determine what needs to be said about the “better than” 
relation and other analogous relations. 
One of Horta’s main claims in section 3 is that the “better than” relation 
is asymmetric: so if, in any given context, A is better than B, all things 
considered, then it can’t also be the case that, in that very same context, B 
is better than A, all things considered. Even I, who am open to rejecting the 
Axiom of Transitivity for the “better than” relation, don’t reject the fact that 
the better than relation is asymmetric! Similarly, while I am open to rejecting 
the Axiom of Transitivity for the “equally as good as” relation, I accept the 
standard view that the “equally as good as” relation is symmetric: so if, in any 
given context, A is equally as good as B, all things considered, then it must 
1. This article was originally written in response to the talk that Horta presented at the 
LEAP symposium on my book, Rethinking the Good: Moral Ideals and the Nature of Practical 
Reasoning (Temkin 2012), at Pompeu Fabra University in Fall 2012, and to an early draft of 
his article based on that talk. Unfortunately, shortly before this journal was to go to press, I 
received the final, revised, version of Horta’s article, and I was somewhat surprised to see that 
he had substantially revised his article, both in terms of adding new material that I hadn’t 
previously seen, and deemphasizing, or removing, some key claims or passages to which my 
original article had objected. I have, where possible, adjusted my article in light of Horta’s final 
changes. However, given the journal’s time constraints, there were some important aspects of 
the final version of Horta’s article to which I was unable to respond. In addition, in some cases 
I have thought it worthwhile to retain points that I raised with respect to his original talk and 
draft, since others may be attracted to views similar to those he previously held, even if Horta, 
himself, has now changed his mind on the matters. Thus, I acknowledge, here, that some of the 
points that I will be making are less relevant, or even not relevant, to his published article, and 
that, in some cases, when I highlight a supposed disagreement between us, the disagreement 
between us may have lessened, or disappeared altogether, since Horta first presented his views 
on these topics. To aid the reader, I try to make it plain in the text where I am mainly responding 
to his talk, as opposed to his published article.
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also be the case that, in that very same context, B is equally as good as A, all 
things considered. 
To these uncontroversial claims, I would simply point out that the 
explanation I give for why the various Axioms of Transitivity could fail to hold, 
does not similarly challenge these other standard claims. In challenging the 
Axioms of Transitivity, I noted that some of the ideals people most value are 
Essentially Comparative. On an Essentially Comparative View, the factors that 
are relevant and significant for assessing an outcome may vary depending 
on the alternative with which it is compared. This opens up the possibility 
that, in any given context, the factors that are relevant and significant for 
comparing A with B, or B with C, may be different from the factors that are 
relevant and significant for comparing A with C. From this it follows that, in a 
given context, A might be better than (or equally as good as) B, in terms of all 
of the factors that are relevant and significant for making that comparison, 
and B might be better than (or equally as good as) C, in terms of all of the 
factors that are relevant and significant for making that comparison, and 
yet A might not be better than (or equally as good as) C, in terms of all of the 
factors that are relevant and significant for making that comparison. Thus, 
I claimed that on an Essentially Comparative View of ideals, the Axioms of 
Transitivity regarding the “better than” and “equally as good as” relations 
may fail, or fail to apply across different sets of alternatives to which we 
might have thought they should apply. 2
However, as indicated, the explanation I give for why the Axioms of 
Transitivity may fail, or fail to apply, offers no reason to doubt the asymmetry 
of the “better than” relation, or the symmetry of the “equally as good as” 
relation. This is because whether one accepts an Internal Aspects View 
(according to which how good an outcome is depends solely on the internal 
features of that outcome), or an Essentially Comparative View of ideals, if, 
in a given context, A is better than B in terms of all of the factors that are 
relevant and significant for comparing A and B in that context, then it will 
be the case that B is worse than (and hence not better than!) A in terms all 
of the factors that are relevant and significant for comparing A and B in that 
2. Some people believe that on an Essentially Comparative View the Axioms of Transitivity 
fail to hold, so that they should be rejected. Others insist that there are various ways of 
preserving the Axiom of Transitivity even on an Essentially Comparative View, so that they 
never fail, but that the Axioms of Transitivity may fail to apply in those cases where Essentially 
Comparative ideals are relevant for assessing different alternatives. In my book, I use the notion 
of non-transitivity to cover both the cases where we think the Axioms of Transitivity fail, and 
those where we think they fail to apply across different sets of alternatives to which we might 
have expected that they should apply. I argue that there are significant practical and theoretical 
implications of the “all-things-considered better than”, “equally as good as”, and “at least as good 
as” relations being non-transitive, whether or not this is because the relations fail, or “merely” 
because they fail to apply in the cases I discuss (Temkin, 2014: 85, note 13). See Temkin 2012: 5, 
16-8, 59-60, 66, 163-182, 197-8, 203-214, 223-5, and ch. 13. 
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context. Thus, “better than” is asymmetric, precisely as Horta has claimed 
and as I, and everyone else, should readily accept.
Similarly, whether one accepts an Internal Aspects View or an Essentially 
Comparative View of ideals, if, in a given context, A is equally as good as B 
in terms of all of the factors that are relevant and significant for comparing 
A and B in that context, then it will be the case that B is equally as good as A 
in terms all of the factors that are relevant and significant for comparing A 
and B in that context. Hence, the “equally as good as” relation is symmetric. 
In sum, I have offered an account of why the Axioms of Transitivity might 
fail to hold, but that account does nothing to challenge the uncontroversial 
claims that “better than” and “equally as good as” are asymmetric and 
symmetric relations, respectively. 
Let me turn next to Horta’s discussion of different Person-Affecting 
Principles. Horta distinguishes between three different kinds of Person-
Affecting Principles:
The Actuality-Dependent Person-Affecting Principle: In assessing possible 
outcomes, one should focus on the status of those who exist in the   actual 
world, with the aim of wanting them to be as well off as possible, and (2) 
ignore the status of those who do not exist in the actual world, except that 
one wants to avoid harming them as much as possible. 
The Time-Dependent Person-Affecting Principle: In assessing possible 
outcomes that haven’t occurred yet, one should focus on those who will exist 
in the outcome that will occur first, with the aim of wanting them to be as 
well off as possible, and (2) ignore the status of those who will not exist in the 
outcome that will occur first, except that one wants to avoid harming them 
as much as possible. 
The Identity-Dependent Person-Affecting Principle: In assessing possible 
outcomes, one should focus on the status of those whose identity is already 
determined, with the aim of wanting them to be as well off as possible, and 
(2) ignore the status of those whose identity is not determined yet, except 
that one wants to avoid harming them as much as possible (Horta 2014: 96). 
I should mention that none of Horta’s versions of Person-Affecting 
Principles correspond exactly to the two versions I discuss in my book, my 
Narrow Person-Affecting View and my Wide Person-Affecting View (Temkin 
2012: 416-45), but this need not concern us here.
In his original talk, Horta contended that while positions like the Actuality-
Dependent, Time-Dependent, and Identity-Dependent Person-Affecting 
Principles might be relevant, in certain circumstances, to our assessment of 
what we ought or ought not to do in choosing between two alternatives, it 
doesn’t follow that such judgments are tracking which of the two alternatives, 
considered just by themselves, is better, per se. Here, too, I agree with Horta.
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Consider, for example, Diagram One. 
A
Q R
B B A
Diagram One
As drawn, Diagram One represents two possible outcomes, Q and R. Each 
outcome contains two groups, a better-off group and a worse-off group. 
There is no difference between the levels or number of people in the two 
better off groups, and similarly, for the two worse-off groups. The only 
difference concerns the identities of the better- and worse-off groups in 
the two outcomes. In Q, the A people occupy the better-off group and the B 
people occupy the worse-off group; in R, the reverse is true.
Assuming there are no morally relevant differences between the A and 
B people—so, for example, each person is equally talented, hardworking, 
deserving, and so on—it seems clear that, considered just by themselves, Q 
and R are equally good. But now, suppose that there were a presently existing 
actual outcome, with people whose identities were already determined, and 
it looked like P in Diagram Two.
AA
P Q R
B AB
Diagram Two
In P, a presently existing actual outcome, the A people already exist, and they 
are at a level between that of the better- and worse-off groups in possible 
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future outcomes Q and R. Suppose, next, that we could transform the P 
outcome into one like Q or R. That is, we could either raise the A people up, 
and bring another group of people, B, into existence at a lower level, so as to 
produce an outcome like Q, or, alternatively, we could bring another group 
of people, B, into existence at a high level, but at the cost of lowering the A 
people, so as to produce an outcome like R. 
In accordance with Horta’s Actuality-Dependent, Time-Dependent, and 
Identity-Dependent Person-Affecting Principles, it would be permissible, 
desirable, and perhaps even obligatory to bring about Q, and impermissible, 
undesirable, and prohibited to bring about R. But even if this showed that P 
would be improved by being changed into Q and worsened by being changed 
into R, that doesn’t entail that Q, considered just by itself, is a worse outcome 
than R, considered just by itself. This should be evident, if one considers the 
fact that instead of the third alternative P, being a presently existing actual 
outcome, it might have been a fourth alternative, O, that was a presently 
existing actual outcome, where O was just like P except that instead of the 
A people existing at a level between the better- and worse-off groups in Q 
and R, the B people existed at that level. In that case, it would have been true 
that on all three of Horta’s Dependent Person-Affecting Principles, O would 
be improved by being changed into R, and it would be worsened by being 
changed into Q. Thus, we would have to abandon the non-asymmetry of the 
“better than” relation if we thought that we could infer that Q was in itself 
better than R, simply from the fact that it would be desirable to transform P 
into Q, but undesirable to transform P into R; because the same reasoning 
would then entail that R was in itself better than Q, since it would also be 
desirable to transform O into R, but undesirable to transform O into Q.
A fortiori, as Horta contended in his talk, even if there are cases where in 
accordance with any of his Dependent Person-Affecting Principles it would 
be obligatory to bring about one outcome, O1, rather than another outcome, 
O2, it doesn’t follow that the judgments yielded by such principles support the 
conclusion that, considered just by themselves, O1 is better than O2. However, 
let me add that Horta’s position is not merely compatible with my claims 
in Rethinking the Good, it follows directly from the fact that Horta’s three 
Person-Affecting Views are Essentially Comparative as I characterized that 
notion. As noted previously, on an Essentially Comparative View, different 
factors can be relevant and significant for assessing the relative goodness 
of outcomes like Q or R, depending on the alternatives with which they are 
compared. Thus, Q might have one value in comparison with R when those 
are the only alternatives, but a different value in comparison with R when 
each is itself an alternative to some third outcome P, and a still different 
value in comparison with R when each is itself an alternative to some fourth 
outcome O. 
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2.
Let me turn next to some points of disagreement with Horta, some of which 
are fairly minor, but others of which are not.
First, in discussing my Spectrum Arguments, Horta titles his subsection 4.1 
“No essentially comparative principle applies in Spectrum Arguments”, and he 
calls special attention to the claim “that appeals to person-affecting reasons 
play no role here” (Horta, 2014: 99). I agree with Horta’s claim that Person-
Affecting Views do not underlie my Spectrum Arguments. 3 However, I take 
exception to the title of his subsection, which, I believe, is either misleading 
or mistaken. 
As I have presented and analyzed them, Spectrum Arguments do 
arise because of the Essentially Comparative View of ideals. Consider, for 
example, my Spectrum Argument where the first member of the Spectrum 
involves a very long life with 15 mosquito bites per month and two years 
of torture, and the last member involves a very long life with 16 mosquito 
bites per month but no torture. I claimed that two distinct views guided 
our thinking in making different comparisons along the Spectrum. The 
First Standard View reflects an Additive-Aggregationist Approach and the 
Second Standard View reflects an Anti-Additive-Aggregationist Approach. 
Both Views are limited in scope, in that they seem relevant and significant 
for making certain comparisons but not others. In particular, I pointed out 
that where the differences in the intensity of pains between two alternatives 
was very small, the First Standard View seemed plausible and appropriate 
for comparing those alternatives, so, in particular, it seemed appropriate for 
comparing my Spectrum’s first alternative with the second, the second with 
the third, the third with the fourth, and so on. On the other hand, where the 
differences in the intensity of pains between two alternatives was very large, 
the Second Standard View seemed plausible and appropriate for comparing 
those alternatives, so, in particular, it seemed appropriate for comparing 
my Spectrum’s first few alternatives with its last few alternatives. Thus, the 
factors that seemed relevant and significant for assessing the Spectrum’s first 
alternative were different depending on whether it was being compared with 
the Spectrum’s second alternative or its last alternative. This is in keeping 
with the Essentially Comparative View of ideals, and is at odds with the 
Internal Aspects View of ideals (see Temkin 2014: section 3, 71; and Temkin 
2012: 62-6, 229-31, 369-74). 
In sum, while it may be true that there is no single Essentially Comparative 
ideal like a Person-Affecting View that underlies my Spectrum Arguments, 
I think it is true that an Essentially Comparative approach best explains 
3. However, like the Spectrum Arguments, Person-Affecting Views challenge the Axioms of 
Transitivity. See Temkin 2014: sec. 5; and Temkin 2012: ch. 12. 
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what is going on in my Spectrum Arguments, and why they ultimately put 
pressure on the Axioms of Transitivity. 
Let me turn to a second point. Horta suggests that my two Standard Views 
are contradictory. 4 I deny this. 
The First and Second Standard Views would be contradictory if there 
were any particular judgments which the First Standard View made which 
were denied by the Second, or vice versa. But this is not, I think, the case. 
For example, where the First Standard View yields the judgment that 
the first member of my Spectrum is better than the second, the Second 
Standard View doesn’t deny this judgment, rather it is silent. Specifically, as I 
characterized it in my book, the Second Standard View simply doesn’t apply 
for comparisons involving such alternatives. Likewise, where the Second 
Standard View yields the judgment that the Spectum’s first member is worse 
than the last, the First Standard View doesn’t deny this judgment, rather it 
is silent. Again, as I characterized it, the First Standard View simply doesn’t 
apply for comparisons involving such alternatives. 
Note, there would be nothing contradictory about the claims that John 
is in love with Mary and that John isn’t in love with Tim, even if Mary is in 
love with Tim. There would also be nothing problematic about such claims, 
and this for the simple reason that “is in love with” isn’t a transitive relation! 
Likewise, there will be nothing contradictory or even problematic about the 
claim that Spectrum’s first outcome is better than the second, but the first is 
not better than the last, even if, for each pair of adjacent outcomes n and n + 
1 along the Spectrum, n is better than n + 1, as long as “all-things-considered 
better than” isn’t a transitive relation. 
But, of course, if, as many believe, the First Standard View is relevant 
and significant for comparing adjacent outcomes along my Spectrum, but 
doesn’t apply for comparing the first and last outcomes, and if, as many also 
believe, the Second Standard View is relevant and significant for comparing 
my Spectrum’s first and last outcomes, but doesn’t apply for comparing my 
Spectrum’s adjacent outcomes, then there is good reason to believe that “all-
things-considered better than” isn’t a transitive relation, in which case the 
First and Second Standard Views won’t be contradictory, and neither will 
their respective judgments that the Spectrum’s first outcome is better than 
the second, but not better than the last. 
Third, Horta suggests that there is a powerful reason to resist being driven 
to “reject the conclusion that transitivity does not apply to [Spectrum cases, 
since]... rejecting that betterness is transitive does not solve the problems 
4. Horta was clearer about this in his talk, than he is in his article, where he seems to 
deemphasize this claim. However, he still seems to hold the view in question. See, for example, note 
9 of Horta 2014: 100, where he writes “Note that the contradictions between the applications of the 
[Spectrum Arguments’] principles sometimes works in different directions... (emphasis added)”.
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implied by the conflict between different standard views (emphasis added)” 
(Horta 2014: 107). Later, Horta emphasizes that “rejecting transitivity fails 
to facilitate a solution. In fact, it make it harder, if not impossible, to do so” 
(Horta 2014: 104). In essence, then, Horta believes that there is no point in 
rejecting transitivity on the basis of Spectrum Arguments, if doing so won’t 
help us to solve such arguments. 5 
To a large extent, I agree with these remarks. Indeed, I emphasize some 
of these very same sentiments in my book, when I’m discussing the costs 
and benefits of accepting or rejecting the different positions underlying 
my impossibility arguments. But, I’m not sure, exactly, what is supposed to 
follow from such observations. 
I am a philosopher seeking the truth. We would very much like to be able 
to answer certain questions in a certain way. But what if the sad truth is that 
the answers we seek are not to be found, or cannot be answered in the way we 
had thought or hoped. Is it not an important advance in our understanding 
of the normative realm if we learn that this is so?
I am reminded here of the Socratic claim regarding why the Oracle called 
him the wisest of all men. It was, Socrates claimed, because whereas most 
people thought that they knew a lot, and were wrong, he knew that he knew 
nothing (other than the fact that he knew nothing!). 6 As Socrates recognized, 
it can be as important to know what we don’t know, and to learn what we can’t 
know, as to continue to seek solutions along a path where they can’t be found.
This raises a related point. Many years ago, when I first began thinking 
about and teaching these issues, Carl Hoefer, who was then still an 
undergraduate, was quite pleased by my results, and the implications he took 
them to have. Hoefer was worried about the dominance of consequentialist 
reasoning in much of contemporary normative reasoning. At the time, 
Hoefer thought it would be better if moral philosophers spent more time 
focusing on considerations of character, of the sort championed by Aristotle, 
or on deontological considerations, of the sort championed by Kant. For 
Hoefer, my results suggested a vindication of sorts for those who thought 
that a focus on consequences, and in particular on the aim of bringing about 
the best available outcome by maximizing the good, was the wrong way to 
proceed in determining how we ought to act, morally. 
Now I don’t abandon the appeal to consequences lightly, if at all. Indeed, 
as I emphasize in my book, I don’t really even see how that could be a 
possible option, and I am certain that there would be enormous costs to 
such a move. Moreover, and more troubling, I’m not sure that virtue-based 
or deontological-based reasoning can wholly avoid the sorts of worries that 
5. Horta was, I think, even clearer about this in his talk, where he really emphasized this point. 
6. The position in question is often attributed to Socrates on the basis of a key passage 
(21d) of Plato’s Apology.
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arise in my book from Spectrum Arguments or an Essentially Comparative 
View of ideals. 7 But having said all that, the mere fact that abandoning the 
transitivity of the “all-things-considered better than” relation wouldn’t help 
us to decide what to do if, for example, we found ourselves facing a Spectrum-
type choice and we wanted to bring about the best available outcome, doesn’t 
show us that transitivity shouldn’t be abandoned. Perhaps, reluctantly, it 
should. However intuitively unpalatable, this is an alternative that requires 
careful consideration. Indeed, perhaps taking such an option seriously will 
force us to pursue other paths in our exploration of the normative realm 
that may ultimately prove to be more fruitful than the paths on which most 
moral philosophers have focused up until now. 
 Let me conclude my response to Horta with some comments on the 
topic of section 6 of his article, moral realism.
As I note in my book, Derek Parfit once claimed that if my arguments 
were sound, they amounted to the most skeptical argument against moral 
realism since David Hume’s arguments. 8 Since neither Parfit nor I are moral 
skeptics, that gave us both reasons to hope that my arguments aren’t sound 
—at least, if Parfit were right in his assessment about their implications. But, 
of course, hoping doesn’t make it so! Moreover, as my previous comment 
suggests, how devastating my results may prove to be will ultimately turn on 
whether other fruitful paths in the normative realm might be found that do 
not fall victim to my arguments.
A key question to be addressed concerns how much of the normative 
realm depends on our being able to provide a coherent ordering, in the form 
of a transitive ranking, of outcomes or choices. Even if, in the end, there is no 
meaningful transitive ranking of outcomes that we can correctly appeal to in 
our normative deliberations, it is arguable that there may still be many full-
blooded realist considerations that would rightly have a bearing on what 
choices we ought, morally, to make in the living of our lives. Perhaps some of 
these would be deontic-, caring-, or virtue-based in nature. But, as implied 
above, perhaps some of these would be along new lines yet to be discovered 
and developed; lines which, perhaps, will only be discovered if we are forced 
to look in new directions for navigating the normative realm. 
Finally, I am a realist in thinking that if we end up abandoning the Axioms 
of Transitivity, it will be because we are recognizing that there are compelling 
reasons to accept Essentially Comparative principles like the Narrow Person-
7. Soon after I sent this article off, Morten Dahlback sent me an email suggesting that 
virtue theorists and deontologists will also face compelling versions of the Spectrum Arguments, 
together with a sketch of an argument for why this is so. In a few subsequent exchanges, we were 
able to revise and tighten up his argument, showing that this is, indeed, the case.
8. Actually, Parfit has made this claim to me on multiple occasions over the years during 
discussions about my work. 
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Affecting View, the Pareto Principle, person-affecting versions of Utility and 
Maximin, and combinations of positions like the First and Second Standard 
Views. That is, I believe that there may be good reasons to abandon the 
Axioms of Transitivity, and that we will only be driven to such a position 
by the force of such reasons. So, this makes me a realist about reasons, as 
opposed to a skeptical anti-realist who denies that there could be reasons to 
accept or reject any particular principles, including principles of consistency 
like the Axioms of Transitivity. 
My position here is similar to that of some people who believe in the 
possibility of genuine moral dilemmas. Consider one classic example of a 
so-called moral dilemma, Sophie’s Choice (Styron 1979). Sophie seemingly 
faced three choices: she could save her son, in which case the Nazis would 
murder her daughter, she could save her daughter, in which case the Nazis 
would murder her son, or she could do nothing, in which case the Nazis 
would murder both her children.
Anti-realists about reasons believe that in the most fundamental sense it 
doesn’t matter what Sophie chooses. Specifically, they believe that, ultimately, 
there are no reasons of any kind guiding Sophie’s choice, or any other choice 
for that matter. On the anti-realist position, there is no reason either way for 
Sophie to save her son, save her daughter, allow both to be killed, or, for that 
matter, to pursue a fourth option of killing both of her children herself, and 
perhaps a lot of other innocent victims who would otherwise have survived!
Those realists about reason who believe in the possibility of genuine moral 
dilemmas (many realists do not), believe that there are overwhelmingly 
compelling reasons for Sophie to save her son, but that there are also 
overwhelmingly compelling reasons for Sophie to save her daughter, and 
that the nature and structure of the reasons in question are such that they do 
not, and cannot, balance or cancel each other out. On their view, the fact that 
she can’t save both of her children doesn’t alter the fact that Sophie should 
save her son, which she can do, and that she should save her daughter, which 
she also can do. Accordingly, for such moral realists, Sophie is facing a moral 
blind alley, or moral dilemma, in the sense that whether she chooses to 
save her son or her daughter she will, in a deep and fundamental way, have 
acted wrongly. On this view, whatever choice Sophie makes, she will have 
unavoidably acted contrary to compelling reasons for acting otherwise than 
she did, reasons which were not cancelled out or balanced by the likewise 
compelling reasons on which she chose to act.
Importantly, such realists would vehemently deny that there are no 
reasons applicable to Sophie’s choice. Contrary to the anti-realist, they 
would insist that Sophie has strong reason not to let both children be killed, 
and even stronger reason not to kill her children herself along with a number 
of other innocent victims who would otherwise survive. But they believe that 
the very real and compelling reasons that have a bearing on her situation 
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put Sophie in a “no win” situation. She must choose to save her son or her 
daughter, but whatever choice she makes will be wrong! On the view in 
question, moral dilemmas are truly tragic situations from which there is 
no rational escape. But they only obtain because there genuinely are moral 
reasons whose nature and structure give rise to such dilemmas. 
My point in discussing moral dilemmas is not to defend the view that 
there are such dilemmas, but to illustrate how such a view is consistent with 
a realist view of reasons. Similar thinking applies, I believe, regarding my 
Spectrum Arguments, or the other arguments I have given threatening the 
Axioms of Transitivity. One may be a realist about reasons, but believe that an 
Essentially Comparative View of ideals is true. If the Essentially Comparative 
View is true, then there may be no transitive ordering of the alternatives in 
my Spectrum Arguments, or of many of the other sets of alternatives my 
book discusses. But this won’t be because the anti-realists are right. Rather, 
it will be because of the nature and structure of the genuine reasons that 
exist, and that bear on the alternatives in question.
Or so I believe, anyway. 
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